Marxist Bulletin No 3 Part IV
Conversations With Wohlforth
Spartacist-ACFI Unity Negotiations
Second Session June 1965
- Present:
- Spartacist: Robertson, Turner, Stoute, (Henry for point
2); Harper (Secretary).
- ACFI: Wohlforth, Mazelis, Michael (alternate for van
Ronk).
Meeting convened at 8:20 p.m. Chairman: Mazelis
- Agenda:
- 1.Minutes
- 2. Joint Statement on Elections
- 3. Policy toward Progressive Labour
- 4. Future discussions
- 5. Announcements
1. Minutes: Minutes of 18 June were approved as
corrected.
2. Joint Statement on Elections:
Wohlforth: We are generally in agreement with the
Spartacist draft and consider parts of it excellent, especially the point on
Epton, but some small points we feel were formulated indefensibly, e.g.,
Eptons proposal for workers to review the actions of the police is a good
one, but Epton raises it independent of the demand for self-defense. We also
need a popular, agitational leaflet to rally people to vote for the SWP and PLP
candidates, since the present draft is primarily a critical, propagandistic
statement. This longer, critical statement after correction should be published
in the Spartacist or Bulletin or both.
Disc: Turner, Mazelis, Henry, Stoute, Wohlforth, Stoute, Henry,
Stoute, Mazelis, Robertson
It was agreed that ACFI would prepare a draft of the popular
leaflet for the next meeting. Spartacist agreed with the tenor of the ACFI
criticisms of the present draft statement and an editing committee of Henry and
Michael was appointed to iron out details and bring back a revised draft to the
next meeting.
3. PL Policy:
Robertson: For a bit of perspective, here is what we said
about Progressive Labor while we were in the SWP:
PL is an aggressive, empirical,
inexperienced, serious grouping aiming at present to build a Leninist combat
party on the basis of an overly primitive and excessively organisational
approach. and Thus PL is a heterogeneous, leftward moving formation
of a broadly centrist character, having broken with Stalinism on a sound basis
of working class struggle and having passed a serious test of loyalty to
elementary principle over the Cuban crisis. But PL is quite without, indeed
seems to deny the need for, a historical, theoretical or concretely
internationalist outlook. Without both recognizing the need for and achieving a
Trotskyist clarity about the nature of the SU and of Stalinism, no formation
(above all one formed as a breakaway from Stalinism) can acquire an authentic
and durable revolutionary quality. (from Memorandum on the
Progressive Labor Group by Harper, Nelson and Robertson, 6
January 1963).
We first became interested in PL when they took a hard line over
the Cuba missile crisis. Some of our comrades were on the Cuba trips and others
were in Harlem Defense Council until they were expelled for Trotskyism. We have
had close relations with PL on the West Coast and in Chicago, and are on good
terms with their Southern organizer. I would say that the leftward motion
within PL seems to have stopped; however, with their organizational hardening
up, information about them has become more difficult to obtain. Our present
impression is that PL is not yet a resolved entity. Our most serious working
relations had been in Harlem and were disrupted by the expulsion of our
comrades. After that HOC has been organized and picked up others. The
indigenous forces in HDC have remained ostentatiously friendly, and we have
united front relations with them in Harlem. Now we seek to pressure PL through
the May 2nd Movement (M2M), but our present contact with PL is much less than
we would like. What we want from PL is similar to what we want from the SWP:
there is an element in both groups that wants to build a revolutionary party in
this country. We want to have a political clarification and confrontation with
PL and have never been interested in merely picking up a member here or there.
We want to see a deep split within the cadre. We want to see the
formation of a large, effective propaganda group in this country, and PL can
make a contribution to that. When you were in the SWP, out of party loyalty you
denounced PL; then, coming to an awareness that they have something to offer,
you went too far in the opposite direction--e.g. you passed out their leaflets
calling for a boycott at the time of the last elections. What you are doing now
seems proper. Some of your comrades have said that the most serious possible
bar to unity would be that it might disrupt your work in this area--that is why
we are very anxious to find out your policy on this question.
Michael: No differences would seem to be present from what
you have said. Basically I would say that there are many people in PL that are
open to a Trotskyist viewpoint and to a line contrary to that of the
leadership. In some convention articles people took a line contrary to that of
the leadership on the Negro question, and many at the convention were
sympathetic to this line, although not willing to openly express support.
People not in the leadership are very open to Trotskyist ideas. For example,
the Gilly articles as long as they were not labelled Trotskyist were very
impressive to these people. My experience has been that it is possible to make
contact with a lot of people and to get our ideas across. One cannot at this
point say exactly where the organization is going. 70-80 people in the
organization are receiving the Bulletin, and it makes an impression on
them.
Wohlforth: In looking back on our work it is easy to see
and admit errors. We obviously made an error in our assessment of PL when we
were in the SWP. At that time we didnt have enough information on them,
nor the same perspective as we now have on how to build a movement. But looking
over our work, I dont see how we could have foreseen what we have
achieved, the basis of a Trotskyist group within PL, so that the struggle
within that organization has been internalized. This of course required the
sale of Challenge and distributing their literature. This is what the
SLL comrades must do in the BLP. I feel that our tactics in the past are
related to our tactics in the future, and any criticisms you have should be
concrete. When you begin such a relationship you have to be more than merely
pedagogic. We have been critical; we ran a series of 4 or 5 articles,
including a complete analysis of the Trotskyist position on Maoism, and put out
special supplements. We concentrated on issues on which there was struggle
within the organization. The Negro question was a critical turning point--the
first time the international orientation of PL cut into what had been the
healthiest side of their work. I think we made an impact at the convention--not
that our positions got many votes, but perhaps 30% of the delegates had some
sympathy toward our position. This discussion is important because it concerns
questions that will be raised again and again in our work in the U.S.--how to
intervene into centrist organizations.
Mazelis: What is implied in Tim [Wohlforth]s comments
is that of course where we felt you to be in error was precisely that you
didnt do what we attempted to do. It is not sufficient to approach them
merely on an organization-to-organization basis (we felt you made some mistakes
on that level also). However we felt you were able to achieve some success in
your work on Epton defense. It clears the air to discuss these questions in the
way Turner and Robertson did. We have no hesitation to confess our errors when
such is the case. When we were in the SWP we had an inadequate understanding of
the nature of PL. We needed more than the political statements of the
leadership. They didnt have the orientation toward mass work that they
have now. Our intervention in PL came at the right time and has followed
developments. I would agree that the leftward motion is not continuing. We
think it has passed a peak of a sort and that PL will stop attracting as it
did.
Robertson: We arent interested in flogging a dead
horse--just in getting a perspective. It doesnt seem that our differences
now are that great. We were quite unhappy about the ban on dual membership. In
one area they would have accepted an open, non-organized Trotskyist, but that
was shelved in the course of events. We had had hopes for H. Wanted her to stay
in PL, but she wouldnt. What we thought was necessary at all costs was to
avoid the organization of a premature caucus--that is what the Stalinist wing
of the leadership would react to most violently, and harden all the cadres
against us. We wanted to build a joint group in Harlem. It worked so well they
had to throw us out. An outsider had to be sent in to do the job--the
indigenous people didnt understand. Now we dont have many toe holds
in PL--that is partly why we are intervening in the Free University. We never
had as much interest in the Negro question in relation to PL as in relation to
the SWP. It wasnt the decisive question for PL that it was for the SWP
when the latter seized upon Black nationalism as a way of eliminating the role
of the party in a primary area in this country. If we Trotskyists in this
country can unite, it will increase our gravitational pull on PL. We want quite
a lot out of them but just now dont have such good tools to grasp.
Turner: There doesnt seem to be much of a difference.
Mazelis: Does the friendliness of the Harlem members extend
to D. and V. too?
Robertson: Our fraction in Harlem CORE got through motions
in defense of Epton and Anderson--they know and appreciate this.
Wohlforth: The political questions within an organization
are the life of the organization. If we looked at PL abstractly we would have
posed internally other questions relating to Maoism, the colonial revolution,
etc. These questions can be hammered home with individuals but dont have
the impact as did the Negro question where many felt the working-class
orientation of PL was being threatened. It is difficult for Spartacist comrades
to see questions as we do because they are not as deeply involved in PL as we
are. If we had unified last fall we could have made a much greater impact.
Because of our consistent work we have been able to develop supporters within
PL, at the expense of doing as much public work as Spartacist was able to do;
but we felt this was necessary. We would strengthen this work if we could
because PL has not yet reached a definitive turning point. We want to reach
their ghetto and trade union members.
Robertson: Do you think we did right with the Harlem
Organizing Committee? We have offered PL help with their election campaign,
which will be one more way of bringing our forces into contact with them. Our
present orientation toward M2M is an open one and we will do more. It is easy
to have united fronts with them in Harlem. HDC does not have all that much of a
mass orientation anyway. When we entered HDC we were foregoing some important
direct mass work, but we felt it was worth it.
Michael: The position of the PL leadership is that
Trotskyism is counter-revolutionary and that it functions to disrupt
revolutionary movements. But this is by no means the feeling of people in the
organization at large. There is a lot of confusion. Denunciation of Trotskyism
was stricken from their convention resolution as a question demanding
discussion. It is difficult for a PL member to look at our stuff in the
Bulletin and then say we are attempting to destroy their organization. I
think things will stay open for a while. There is a gap between the leadership
and the rank-and-file on questions like this.
Mazelis: On HOC, what I have seen looks quite positive, but
we are not aware of the details. What we see now is positive. The only thing is
that we would stress the importance of a continuing orientation toward the
Harlem PLers themselves. On the question that has been raised at one level or
another, i.e., should the orientation be toward the organization as a whole or
toward picking up people? Our work in PL was not a raiding operation. When they
saw we were reaching people, they viewed it as a raiding operation. We have
followed the development of the central leadership and participated in give and
take with them, for example over the Negro question.
Wohlforth: On the relationship of PL work
to our whole work--we see that the essential need at the present time is for
the theoretical development of those that wish to become revolutionary
Marxists, people who want to be and feel themselves to be Marxists but who are
actually empiricists as is PL and the best of the SWP. The essential character
of the movement today is excessive emphasis on activity in struggle and deep
hostility to theory to guide this struggle. Our intervention is always aimed at
bringing theoretical clarity and development. This must be done from the
outside. There are several thousand people who have rejected the Democratic and
Republican parties, the CP and the SWP and who want to build something new.
Because of the existence of these people, our essential task is to work with
them and develop them. We must be wary of counterposing ourselves to these
people rather than being their theoretical arm. We must be careful that we are
not just one more competing organization. We must be the ones who bring theory
to the revolutionaries, the conscious people among the revolutionaries.
Therefore we give more emphasis to working in organizations than to setting
ourselves up as a separate organization. This should be the orientation of any
group this side of 1,000. I have been feeling for some time and the British
have been feeling for some time that the next step in the political and
theoretical development in the Trotskyist movement must be a conscious
understanding of how we seek to go about building the American movement--the
American Question. We have therefore been asked and have been considering
preparing for the International discussion a resolution on the American
Question, and we feel the Spartacist comrades should do the same thing. This
would be the best way to clarify agreement or disagreement on our tasks. I feel
this is the way we should function. One final point: I feel we have made very
good progress on the discussion on how we might work together toward PL.
Because we have shown so much agreement we could go ahead and in a concrete way
work on the basis of this agreement. We are not going to have meaningful
functioning in any arena if we have two groups opposing each other in military
formation. Meaningful collaboration necessitates that at the same time that we
see agreement we work together concretely to bring about better relationships
between our two groups.
Turner: Your approach on not counterposing organizations
but becoming the theoretical arm --what is your feeling toward HOC? Is this a
counterposed organization, or do you feel that this organization can also
function in Harlem?
Wohlforth: The situation is so mixed up in the Negro
movement that I would say you did the right thing. If CORE, OAAU etc had
anything to offer, I would say you were premature. But you are dealing in a
vacuum. It is the only thing you could do. I think it was a good idea and would
work out well in this area, though the same approach might not work out
elsewhere.
Robertson: We did not seek HOC but it was thrust upon us.
We still have a fraction in Harlem CORE. On being the theoretical arm of the
movement and not counterposing organizations--as soon as you act, as soon as
there is concrete expression of a line, there has to be an organizational form,
and sometimes this form gets in the way. If you gain size, you draw people
around, you give classes etc. We are co-equally interested in work concerning
other organizations and their political development, and also in building our
own organization. It is not a simple process to build a large propaganda group
that can begin to intervene in a meaningful way. We must win over to the
Trotskyist movement whole chunks of other organizations while carrying on the
work of the Spartacist organization (or any other Trotskyist organization).
Even if there were no broader significance to our mass work, it has an
exemplary quality: See what we will do when we have more. Secondly,
such work gives familiarity and experience to our members. In trade union work,
we have been inching our way toward building an industrial fraction, but a big
white collar fraction on the other hand is dropping into our lap. On PL we
differ in details, but these differences are within a recognized common
approach. We believe that a close political agreement exists between our groups
such that unity is possible and desirable; but without your admitting this we
dont see how we can take our relationship beyond united fronts. You have
not yet even agreed that we are qualitatively closer to you and should seek
unification than you are for example to Workers World, etc. Without your
agreement that there is a principled political basis for unity how can
we press forward organizationally? On preparing a document on the American
Question for the information of the British, it will be up to our organization
to decide as we are currently straining to get out our convention documents.
Wohlforth: We feel that common work will facilitate the
unification process just as common discussion on all levels will. A bar to that
work and those discussions hinders the unification process. My own opinion is
that we will come to the conclusion that while disagreements may exist it is
not a bar to unification. We dont understand this military to military
sort of thing. Contact between our groups will break down barriers to
unification which may exist among members or leaders. I would hate to see
common work by-passed for this discussion process, for this will take awhile.
Robertson: We dont see the necessity for a long delay
in unification. We have in our briefcase all the steps to bring about
unification. As far as joint collaboration without this agreement, there has
never been a unity without proceeding as we are proceeding now. The
representatives on this committee speak for their organizations. In negotiating
unity you proceed organization-to-organization. We will go through the
discussion here, though we already feel a sufficient basis for unity exists.
Some of our comrades dont want unity, but every single comrade agrees
that unity is necessary anyway, and they feel that if the unification is gone
into in good faith that old hostilities will be overcome. The present stumbling
block is that we must get your agreement that unity is permissible. How can we
do anything else?
Turner: The more we talk the less reason there seems to be
for a division between our groups. Tonights discussion shows how close we
are politically. It would seem that it necessitates recognition from your group
that all the discussion thus far shows that every reason for unity exists. With
the opportunities that exist, our combined organization could achieve a
qualitative acceleration in our work, using our resources and talents in a
combined way resulting in more and better output on all levels. It is necessary
at this point before beginning close collaboration that we get this agreement
that the political basis for unity exists. We can get no less from you before
proceeding.
Wohlforth: I dont think we are demanding too much in
wanting to see first the documents on which your organization will go forward
from your conference. I feel strongly that when we do see these documents that
the formulations therein will not in themselves be a bar to unity. We need to
see the documents, but dont anticipate that they will include such
material as to bar unity. It is not necessarily critical if you dont
write an American document, but it would be good if you could.
4. Future Discussions: It was decided to discuss
next Wohlforths history project, The Struggle for Marxism in the
U.S. This topic will cover all aspects of the SWP, including our own 1962
split, current SWP groupings and convention perspectives etc.
5. Announcements:
(a) Joint Social: Leaflet copy is ready. Groups will share
profits. There will be a literature table.
(b) Reactions to possible unity: Robertson announced he had
received two responses to the possibility of unity between our groups from
non-members of either group. Malcolm Bruce expressed great joy at the prospect;
Bill Winnick also strongly favors unity.
(c) Next Meeting: Holiday next weekend interferes; next
meeting set for Friday, 9 July.
(d) Minutes: Because of the delay in meeting again, it was
agreed to circulate draft minutes beforehand and, if unanimity is found for
their approval, to proceed to mimeograph them in advance of the next meeting.
Meeting adjourned at 10:10 p.m.
These minutes approved at meeting of 9 July 1965.
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